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Abstract: 
The extension of the franchise to social groups with less property and income is associated 
with greater income redistribution from the rich to the poor and extension in the provision of 
public goods, which leads to the growth of government expenditure. All of these expected 
changes are costly and therefore a higher taxation of citizens and industrial firms can be 
expected, which might have negative effects on investors behavior. 
The present paper studies the effects of changes in the suffrage in the Kingdom of Saxony at 
the end of the 19th Century on stock market prices of Saxon firms listed on the Berlin stock 
exchange: Here the electoral law was changed twice: In 1896 a very restrictive franchise was 
introduced, which was abolished in 1909 and replaced by a more democratic electoral law. By 
applying standard event study methodology, we can provide evidence that the restriction of 
the electoral law had positive effects on Saxon firms on the stock market, whereby the 
extension in 1909 had negative effects on the stock market.  
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Introduction 
 
Nowadays, most rich countries are democracies and most poor countries are dictatorships. 
Democratic societies provide institutions that ensure economic and political freedom, protect 
property rights and improve opportunities for the population to run economic business. These 
institutions form frameworks of functioning markets and ensure liberty and contentment and 
are generally believed to encourage economic growth. This causality could be found in many 
empirical analyses.1  
On the other hand democratic institutions may also have growth retarding features. The 
argument goes as follows: more participation of the working poor may lead to more 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, extension of the provision of public goods 
and thus a rise in government expenditure which will then be financed with higher taxation of 
the richer population. Higher taxation reduces income of capital owners, who might then 
withdraw or reduce investment - which reduces the ability of firms to overcome liquidity 
constraint which has negative effects on industrial growth and thus economic development.2  
The Kingdom of Saxony is the perfect case to study these effects on investment behavior and 
firm valuation for four reasons:3 First, the electoral law was changed twice within a very short 
period. The law introduced in 1896 reduced the possibility of participation of the working 
poor and the law from 1909 extended it again. That way it is possible to study both, the effect 
                                                           
1
 See for instance Lipset (1959), Olson (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Leblang (1996, 1997)  
2
 See for instance Husted and Kenny (1997), Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), 
Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Lott and Kennedy (1999). Barro (1996) finds a u-shaped relationship between 
democracy and growth. More democracy - as measured by an index of political freedom - seems to enhance 
growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of political freedom has 
already been attained. 
3
 The study is inspired by the work of Turner and Zhan (2010). They analyzed the impact of the 1867 Reform 
Act in Britain that extended the suffrage to the skilled but propertyless urban classes on stock market prices. 
They found that investors reacted negatively to the extension of suffrage. 
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of reduced and increased political participation of the working poor in an environment were 
other factors remained relatively stable.  
Second, the political culture in the kingdom was very polarized. On the one hand the kingdom 
was a center of the Social democrats, which was the party of the workers, demanding more 
redistribution, higher taxation of the rich and the extension of public goods. In the elections to 
the general parliament of the Reich, were much more voters were eligible to vote, the 
Kingdom was almost completely represented by this party. On the other hand, in the elected 
parliament of the kingdom, the Social democrats were mostly not represented at all (Ritter 
1990).  
Third, the Kingdom of Saxony was the third largest state of the German Kaiserreich and its 
most industrialized region. Furthermore it had a very high level of capitalization.4 Joint stock 
companies listed in Berlin and on regional stock markets had an overall value of nearly fifty 
percent of the Saxon GDP in 1909. 5 Reduced investment on the stock market which leads to 
falling prices of stocks therefore has a strong effect on short- run industrial growth and 
possibly long run development of the entire region.  
Fourth, the German Kaiserreich was a federal system where most important decisions lay 
within the member states. The Reich was responsible for military and foreign policy, whereas 
the states were completely autonomous in terms of taxation, education, culture and 
jurisdiction (Berghahn 2003, pp.360). There was no tax directly paid to the Reich. Saxony had 
its own taxation and it paid a certain amount of its tax revenues as member state contributions 
to the Reich (Ullmann 2005, 60). Thus, the state elections were in terms of power and 
influence more important than the imperial elections. 
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 For the correlation of stock market capitalisation and growth see for Levine and Zervos (1998). 
5
 Own calculation, Data on GDP see Hoffmann (1959), Capitalisation taken From Salinger Börsenhandbuch 
(1909). 
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In the reaction to the changes of the electoral law, we find that an extension of the suffrage to 
the benefit of the poor leads to negative returns and a reduction of the suffrage to positive 
returns for Saxon firms listed and traded at the Berlin stock exchange. Thus the positive 
effects of democracy were obviously less present in 19th century Germany than its possible 
negative effects for markets. This is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective, the 
results further show that at least capitalists and possible investors from the middle class 
remained of the conviction that democratic structures and participation of more citizens, 
which slowly but constantly spread, was wrong and rather harmful to the economy. This is the 
first quantitative evidence of such antidemocratic sentiments and contributes to the literature 
on why Germany remained autocratic for such a long time and the debate about the ability of 
the Germany Kaiserreich to modernize and change at all6. 
Although Saxony’s constitutional changes were rather special at the time- Retallack (1990, 
276) called it ‘konstitutioneller Sonderweg’, Lässig (1996, 24) points out that contemporary 
observers from all political camps shared the common belief that the development in Saxony 
in 1909 may have implications for the entire Reich. Although the highly restrictive suffrage in 
Prussia persisted until the end of the Kaiserreich, the entire period was characterized by the 
debate about a possible change and more participation of the working poor.  
The paper is organized as follows: The first section describes the historical circumstances and 
the economic situation of the kingdom of Saxony and shows that it can be a treated as 
representative case study for the whole Reich at the time, the second section discusses the 
theoretical framework and related literature and derives the hypotheses, the third section 
contains the analysis, a fourth section contains robustness checks and a final section 
concludes. 
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 See for instance: Dahrendorf (1994), Wehler (1994), Lepsius (1993). 
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Why Saxony? The Constitution, electoral laws and the Rise of the Social 
democrats 
 
In the late 19th and early 20thcenturies, Saxony was one of the most industrialized regions in 
Germany. Table 1 gives an overview of the occupational structure in Saxony compared to the 
whole Kaiserreich.  
 
(Table 1 about here)  
 
The table shows that already in 1882 fifty six percent of the working population was 
employed in the industrial sector. This was the largest share in the whole Reich and far above 
the national average of 35 percent. In 1907, the agricultural sector accounted for only about 
11 percent of the working population which is comparable to England at the time (Ritter, 
1990, 50-52). The most important sectors were textiles, machines and metal working. In all of 
the 23 constituencies of the imperial election (Reichstagswahlen) the majority of the 
electorate was working in the industrial sector. In the whole Reich we count 195 out of 397 
constituencies where this was the case (Ritter, 1990, 51). Compared to other member states of 
the Reich, Saxony had also quite a high GDP per capita (Table 2). 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
One might raise the question whether it makes sense to study democratic institutions in a 
kingdom since political participation must have been very limited per se. Since the adoption 
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of the constitution of 7th September 1831, the political system consisted of a two chamber 
parliament, where both chambers had equal rights.7 The first chamber consisted of members 
of nobility and knighthood, whereas the second chamber was elected by the population 
(Blaschke 1997, 18). The king appointed the ministers and the government. He further had the 
right to dissolve the second chamber at any time without particular reason and exclude 
persons from the first chamber. The king and both chambers had the right to draft a law and 
all three had to agree before a law could be passed (§§85/86 of the Saxon Constitution). Thus 
although participation was limited, the elected politicians were able to actively influence 
policy. Furthermore none of the kings, neither a grey eminence nor an ambitious woman used 
their opportunities to participate in the political process, which was mainly left to government 
and chambers (Blaschke 1997, 16). 
The kingdom of Saxony is further a good example since it was theoretically quite classical in 
terms of its development of voting rights for Europe. In the first phase from 1831 to 1867, the 
possibility to participate in the political process was dependent on estate criteria. From 1867 
to 1896, the electoral law for the second chamber of parliament restricted the right to vote by 
income and property criteria with an equal weighting of votes. Every male above the age of 
25 who paid at least three Marks property tax had the right to vote.8 A further difference to the 
federal franchise for the Reichstag, which was not restricted by income, was the renewal of 
one third of the members of parliament every two years (Opitz 1887, 51). However, the 
amount of eligible voters was very small with only about ten to fourteen percent (Ritter 1980, 
164).  
In 1896 an electoral law similar to the Prussian design was introduced. The new law slightly 
extended the suffrage to a larger base of voters, but introduced formal inequality through 
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 For the full text of the constitution see Huber (1986). 
8
 This amount of tax had to be paid for an income of about 600 Marks per year. Men who lost their civil rights 
were excluded.  
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different weights on votes (Lässig, 1996, 251). This law, supported by Conservatives, 
National liberals and Progressives, divided voters into three groups depending on the amount 
of income and property tax they paid. In every electoral district, each class chose an elector. 
The members of parliament were then elected by the electors by a simple majority vote in the 
particular constituency. The first class was constituted by the voters paying the highest 
amount of direct tax until they represented one third of all taxes, the second class by citizens 
who paid the second third of taxes and all others voted in the third class. It was a little less 
severe than the electoral law in Prussia, because tax payments above 2000 Marks were not 
counted and every citizen who paid more than 300 Marks was a member of the first group and 
above 38 Marks in the second group. In order to be allowed to vote in the third group, the 
citizen had to live in Saxony for at least six months and pay tax, independent on the amount. 
This suffrage excluded a quarter of the voters that had the right to vote in the imperial 
elections from voting in state elections, which was not much more restricting than the 
previous law. Still about 15 percent of the population had a right to vote, although this vote 
might not have had much of an impact. Between 1897 and 1909, 3-4 percent were accredited 
to vote in the first class, 15-18 percent in the second class and 78 to 81 percent in the third 
class. The vote of a voter from the first class therefore counted about 20 to 25 times as much 
as a vote of a third class voter.9 That explains why social democrats only managed to win one 
seat in the whole period (in the year 1905), although they dominated the votes in the third 
class (Ritter, 1990, 74).10  
The law that was introduced on the 5 of May in 1909 was technically not an “extension” of 
the suffrage since it slightly reduced the electorate, because it restricted the right to vote to 
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 Taking into account the modus of election, the 80 percent of voters in the third class could easily be excluded 
from political power if the delegates of the second and first class cooperated within an electoral district.  
10
 Table 2 shows the result of the State elections from 1901 to 1909.  
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persons who were living in Saxony since two years and were not behind to pay tax for more 
than one year. More important, however, was the reintroduction of direct voting, abolishment 
of supplement elections (Elections should now takes place every 6 years), and the 
introduction of plural voting. Plural voting means that every voter had one vote but could get 
up to three additional votes according to income, property, education or age. Based on income 
or property alone up to two additional votes could be gained. Special groups such as civil 
servants or employees with a notice period above six weeks, who earned above 2500 Marks 
or a farm owner of more than 8 ha land, could get 4 votes in total. Based on education (at least 
six years of schooling in middle or high school) one could get one additional vote, if one had 
no additional vote for any other reason. And last, all citizens above the age of 50 received one 
additional vote, if they had not already four votes, which was the maximum one could get 
(Ritter 1980, 167). This new law reduced the bias of the different weighting and thus leads to 
an extension of the impact of the votes of the working poor. Thus we call the introduction of 
this law and “extension of the suffrage”. Figure 1 illustrates this fact. The figure reads similar 
to a Lorenz curve. In 1896 for instance, votes of 80 percent of the voters accounted for about 
one third of all votes, whereas in 1909 80 percent of the voters held about 60 percent of all 
votes.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Contemporary debates reveal that the restriction of the suffrage in 1896 was clearly aimed at 
preventing the Social democrats from reaching important administrative positions and thus a 
“governance of the masses” (Herrschaft der Massen). It is further interesting to note that the 
new suffrage was introduced after the Social democrats proposed an equal universal suffrage 
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for men and women in the regional parliament of Saxony (Ritter, 1997, 64). The only 
difference to the famous Three-class-voting of Prussia was that the vote in Saxony was still 
secret. This feature remained only because the National liberals feared “terror of workers and 
Social democrats to small firms in order to influence the outcome of the election” (Ritter 
1997, 65). Ritter (1997, 67) further cites a protocol published after the introduction of the new 
suffrage in which Conservatives, National liberals and Progressives promised to have a 
special focus on the protection of property rights. This can be interpreted as the reaction of the 
established parties on the observation that contemporary capitalists were well aware that 
increased suffrage might damage profits and weaken property rights. The result was dramatic. 
In the first election after the introduction of the new electoral law in 1897, the Social 
democrats lost about 40 percent of their seats (see Table 3).11 
During the whole period the political system was very polarized: On the one hand – in 
imperial elections – a very strong Social democracy won almost all seats. And on the other 
hand a stable conservative-liberal cartel dominated the suffrage restricted elections in the 
kingdom (Lässig, 1997, 204). The aim to reduce the impact of the Social democrats by 
introducing a restricted suffrage even increased the polarization between imperial elections 
and state elections. In 1903, in the first imperial election after the introduction of the restricted 
suffrage on state level, the Social democrats won all constituencies- with the exception of 
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 The Conservatives in Saxony did not possess the strong agrarian character that was typical for the party on 
Reich level. They also represented the interests of commerce and industry. The liberal character of the party 
caused the other liberals party, the National liberals, to represent rather right-wing interests, more than elsewhere 
in Germany at the time (Lässig 1996, 41). The principles of the opposing Social democrats were manifested in 
the Erfurter Programm of 1891, which contained several practical demands in favor of the working class, such as 
the improvement of labour conditions, the eight-hour working day, free health care and not at least religion as a 
private matter (Treue 1954, 72). The Germans (Deutsche Freisinnige Partei) and the Party of Progress (Deutsche 
Fortschrittspartei) were mainly liberal with an emphasis on civil and parliamentary rights (Treue 1954, 70). The 
first party represented the interests of the upper classes and commerce, whereas the latter one saw itself as a 
advocate to the lower middle class and a strong Prussia (Fricke 1983, 623, 657), which is also reflected in the 
party manifesto of 1861, which included a ‘strong central authority in the hands of Prussia’ (Treue 1954, 48). 
The Reformer (Deutsche Reformpartei) originated from the splitting of the German Socials (Deutschsoziale 
Reformpartei) in 1900, both of them were anti-Semitic and saw themselves as ‘Mittelstandspartei’ (middle class) 
(Fricke 1984, 63, 540) 
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one- Bautzen. This success of the Social democrats exceeded all their hopes and all fears of 
capitalists (Lässig, 1996, 101). 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Theoretical Background, related Literature and Hypotheses 
 
The extension of the franchise to social groups with less property and income is associated 
with greater income redistribution from the rich to the poor (Husted and Kenny 1997, Justman 
and Gradstein 1999, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Lizzeri and Persico (2004) also suggest 
that an extension of the franchise leads to an extension in the provision of public goods, which 
also leads to the growth of government expenditure (Husted and Kenny 1997, Lott and Kenny 
1999). Aids and Jensen (2009, 379) observe that in Western European countries from 1860 to 
1938 broadening of the electorate generally increases government spending and direct taxes, 
given the population exhibited a certain level of literacy.12  
All of these possible and expected changes are costly. These additional costs are expected to 
be financed by higher taxation of richer citizens, but also of industrial firms. An extension of 
the suffrage to poorer citizens will thus reduce expected profits for industrial firms. Investors, 
who are not based in the kingdom and therefore unaffected by rising income tax, might step 
away from investing in Saxony and rather invest in other regions where the power of voters 
and therefore costs and tax for industrial firms are lower and expected profits higher. 
Investors, who live in the kingdom, face possible higher taxation trough two channels: a rise 
in income tax and a rise in tax for joint stock companies. Thus, they would possibly substitute 
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 The critical value for this effect is a rate of children enrolled at school of about 62 percent. This is given, since 
already in the 1880s nearly all children attended in school and illiteracy was extremely rare in imperial Germany. 
(Kuhlemann 1991, 192) 
10 
 
their investment away from Saxon firms and possibly even reduce investment at all, although 
the latter only hits after the actual rise of taxation.  
On the other hand, we expect that investors anticipate a restriction of the suffrage with lower 
or at least unchanged taxation, less or unchanged redistribution of incomes and more 
protection of income and property rights. 
From the theoretical literature we can formulate Hypothesis 1:  
Events associated with an extension of the suffrage will lead to negative returns on the stock 
market for firms headquartered in Saxony.  Events associated with a reduction of the suffrage 
will have positive effects on their returns on the stock market.  
Since in the case of Saxony the latter only ensures that the economic situation remains 
unchanged, Hypothesis 2 can be formulated as follows:  
The effect of the restriction of the suffrage will be lower than the extension of the suffrage on 
the stock market, since the latter was associated with direct changes of the political and 
economic environment rather than just keeping the status quo. 
The social democrats - the party of the working poor - was the party that gained most by the 
change in the electoral law 1909. According to their party manifesto signed in the city of 
Erfurt in 1891, they claimed – among other things- general equal suffrage including the right 
to vote for women, free schooling and educational material, free legal advice for the poor and 
free medical health care. They further suggested that the rising government expenditure 
should be accounted for by higher income and property tax.13 This fits perfectly well the 
expectations from the theoretical literature.14  
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 Ausgehend von diesen Grundsätzen fordert die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands zunächst: 1. 
Allgemeines, gleiches, direktes Wahl- und Stimmrecht mit geheimer Stimmabgabe aller über 20 Jahre alten 
Reichsangehörigen ohne Unterschied des Geschlechts für alle Wahlen und Abstimmungen. 
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The conservatives, who lost many seats were also agitating against capitalists. Kunze, one of 
the leading politicians of the conservatives was cited in the Newspaper Sächsische Industrie, a 
magazine for industrialist and capitalists, on the 10 of October 1909: “The liberals aim at 
absolute dominance of capital and thereby leave crafts, tradesmen and agriculture to 
speculation and exploitation.  They have nothing but empty words and false promises for the 
needs of the working population. They completely fail in moments when the stock markets or 
the mobile capital could be affected. As the party of large bankers, large industrialists, joint 
stock companies and syndicates they try to exploit the working poor and the middle class for 
their political ends.”15 The expected positive effects caused by the losses of the conservatives 
might have balanced out the negative effect anticipated from the gains of the Social 
democrats, but this is very unlikely. In contrast to the conservatives in Prussia or the rest of 
the Reich where the conservatives were the party of the agricultural elites, the conservatives 
in Saxony were composed of a broad spectrum that included higher ranks of economy, 
administration and military (Retallack 1992, 65). It seems quite obvious that they rather tried 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Proportionalwahlsystem, und bis zu dessen Einführung gesetzliche Neueinteilung der Wahlkreise nach jeder 
Volkszählung. Zweijährige Gesetzesperioden. Vornahme der Wahlen und Abstimmungen an einem gesetzlichen 
Ruhetag. Entschädigung für die gewählten Vertreter. Aufhebung jeder Beschränkung politischer Rechte außer 
im Falle der Entmündigung […],Obligatorischer Besuch der öffentlichen Volksschulen. Unentgeltlichkeit des 
Unterrichts, der Lehrmittel und der Verpflegung in den öffentlichen Volksschulen sowie in den höheren 
Bildungsanstalten für diejenigen Schüler und Schülerinnen, die kraft ihrer Fähigkeit zur weiteren Ausbildung als 
geeignet erachtet werden, [..],Unentgeltlichkeit der Rechtspflege und des Rechtsbeistandes. Rechtsprechung 
durch vom Volk gewählte Richter. Berufung in Strafsachen. Entschädigung unschuldig Angeklagter, Verhafteter 
und Verurteilter, […], Unentgeltlichkeit der ärztlichen Hilfeleistung einschließlich der Geburtshilfe und der 
Heilmittel. Unentgeltlichkeit der Totenbestattung. […] Stufenweise steigende Einkommens- und 
Vermögenssteuer zur Bestreitung aller öffentlichen Ausgaben, soweit diese durch Steuern zu decken sind. 
Erbschaftssteuer, stufenweise steigend nach Umfang des Erbgutes und nach dem Grade der Verwandtschaft. 
Abschaffung aller indirekten Steuern, Zölle und sonstigen wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen, welche die 
Interessen der Allgemeinheit den Interessen einer bevorzugten Minderheit opfern. (Erfurter Programm, 
published in Kautsky, 1892) 
14
 In fact tax did not change significantly in the two years after the election. This analysis, however, is about 
expectations. It does not matter whether the level of tax actually changed or not after the extension of the 
suffrage. The change in the returns on the stock market can be interpreted as expectations about changes.  
15
 “Die Liberalen erstreben die uneingeschränkte Herrschaft des Grosskapitals und geben Kleingewerbe und 
Handwerk, Grund und Boden der Spekulation und Ausbeutung preis. Sie haben für die Notlage des schaffenden 
Volkes nur hohle Worte und trügerische Versprechungen, sie versagen vollständig, wenn der Geldbeutel der 
Börse, des mobilen Großkapitals in Frage kommt. Als Partei der Grossbankiers, der Grossindustriellen, der 
Aktiengesellschaften und Syndikate suchen Sie den kleinen Mann und den Mittelstand mit schönen Worten vor 
Ihren Wagen zu spannen.“ (Sächsische Industrie 10. Oktober 1909, 3). 
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to attack the Liberals in order to catch some votes from the left wing. Traditionally, they had 
no intension to harm capitalists or redistribute property or income (see Wehler 1994, 85). 
Furthermore, Ullmann (2005, 88) mentions that public tax morality might have changed in 
this period and citizens became more sensitive about the questions of how much tax would be 
acceptable. The conservative politican Kunze as cited in Sächsische Industrie on the 10 of 
October, also claimed that joint stock companies clearly evaded tax and that with another tax 
(here succession tax) they would try to avoid paying this as well16.  
Thus, if capitalists were indeed in the position to avoid paying tax, the threatening of higher 
taxation caused by an extension of the suffrage would not have such a negative effect on 
investment behavior. 
Methodology 
 
We study the effect on changes or possible changes in the political rights on Saxon firms on 
the Berlin stock exchange with standard event study methodology (see Binder 1998, 124)17.  
Figure 2 illustrates the approach. In an estimation period [T0, T1], which is unaffected by the 
event- the estimation window- we estimate expected (normal) returns. In an event window 
[T1, T2] the event under considerations takes place at time 0 and the event can affect the stock 
market during the event window, i.e., before and after the event takes place. The estimation 
window for the normal returns is set to 120 trading days before the event window. 18 Five 
different event windows, measured in days are selected: 28 days [-14; +14], 14 days [-7; +7], 
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 [..] Er wies darauf hin, dass die Aktiengesellschaften den Versuch gemacht hätten, die Talonsteuer zu 
umgehen und erklärte, von solchen Leuten, die vor aller Welt die Steuern hinterzögen, könne man auch mit 
Sicherheit erwarten, dass sie bei der Erbschaftssteuer wenigstens im Dunkeln dasselbe versuchen würden.“ 
((Sächsische Industrie 10. Oktober 1909, 3). 
17
 For an overview of this method see MacKinlay (1997) 
18
 Excluding Sundays and bank holidays when the stock market was closed. 
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(i.e. one week before the event and one week after the event), 14 days [-14; 0], 14 days [0; 
14], and six days [-3; +3]. 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
The expected returns can be estimated with different methods. We estimate them with two 
standard models: the market model or the constant mean return model. The market model is a 
statistical model which relates the return of any given security to the return of the market 
portfolio19. The model’s linear specification follows from the assumed joint normality of the 
asset returns. For any security i the expected returns are estimated according to the following 
equation using the market model: 
 
itmtiiit RRE εβα ++=)(   (1) 
With ( ) 0=itE ε  and ( ) 2titVar εσε =  
 
Where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on stock i and the market portfolio, respectively. 
itε  is the error term, whose variance is assumed to be constant over time.  Rmt is based on the 
stock market index published by Gelman and Burhop (2008). This index is based on 27 firms 
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 Returns of firm i are calculated as the difference of the logarithms of the corrected share prices between t and 
t-1:  )ln()ln( 11 −− +−+ itititit SZpSZp , where SZit denotes the accumulated fraction of the Stückzins (see 
footnote 29) and Pit the price of firm i time t. We also include dividends, which were taken from Berliner 
Börsenzeitung. 
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that were continually listed on the Berlin stock exchange. In order to avoid a bias and to 
construct an appropriate benchmark portfolio, firms based in Saxony were removed.20  
The second way to calculate the normal returns is the constant mean return model. For any 
security i, the constant mean return model is: 
itiitRE ζµ +=)(   (1) 
With ( ) 0=itE ζ  and ( ) 2titVar εσζ =  
We then calculate abnormal returns in the event window. Specifically, abnormal returns of the 
shares of firm i at time t are calculated as:  
ARit = Rit −E(Rit), 
where Rit is a stock’s realized return for time t and where E(Rit) is its expected return in the 
absence of the event, as calculated above. 
We then calculate the average cumulated abnormal return (ACAR) from t=T1 to t=T2 
∑∑
= =
=
N
i
T
Tt
itARN
ACAR
1
2
1
1
 (3), 
where N is the number of stocks in our sample during each event. To test the significance of 
the ACARs, the variance of the ACARs is estimated by using cross-sectional variance across 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the various companies. This cross-sectional approach 
takes account of increase in event period variance (Campbell et al. 1997; 168, Turner and 
Zhan 2012, 620). Using the cross-sectional approach to form an estimator of the variance 
gives:  
                                                           
20
 The authors thank Carsten Burhop for the provision of the detailed data set on which the stock market index is 
based. 
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i ACARCARN
ACARVar
1
2
2 )(
1)( (4), 
The test statistic is then calculated as: 
)(ACARVar
ACAR
t =
, 
which is asymptotically standard normal. 
To verify the robustness of these results, we further apply the generalised rank 
(GRANK) test as described in Kothari and Pythonnen (2011), which accounts for both event-
induced volatility and cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns among firms. The latter 
is of particular concern, since the event-day is the same for all firms, i.e. we face “event-date 
clustering”. Such clustering can lead to a correlation of abnormal returns among firms on the 
event-date, which bias the test-statistic downwards and leads to an over-rejection of the null-
hypothesis of no abnormal returns. The generalised rank test corrects the event-day standard 
deviation by the average correlation of abnormal returns in the sample.21 Additionally, unlike 
other modifications of the rank test, the generalised rank test also allows for multiple-day 
event windows in the analysis, which is useful since in our particular context we can apply the 
same event windows as above and compare whether the results remain significant. This can 
be done by aggregating abnormal returns over the event window similar to the standard 
ACAR-approach and then assigning a single rank to the cumulated abnormal return of each 
firm.22 Another advantage of using non-parametric tests such as the generalised rank test is 
that we do not need to make specific assumptions about the distribution of the returns (see 
Campbell et al. 1996, 172). 
 
                                                           
21
 See Kolari and Pythonnen (2010) for details. 
22
 A formal exposition of the GRANK test is given in the Appendix. 
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Events 
 
We study the effects of six events that occurred in the period from 1896 to 1909 (see Table 4). 
Our main source to detect event dates was the Frankfurter Zeitung, one of the most important 
national newspapers and financial dailies in Imperial Germany. Except for the mass 
demonstration and the day when the law passed in the parliament 1909 we take the first day 
when the event appeared in the Germany wide newspaper ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’. The mass 
demonstration and the change in law in 1909 were only mentioned in regional newspapers. 
The first event that we analyze is the day on which the new law that restricted the suffrage 
was published, the 28 of March 1896 (Gold 1995, 42). The new law was mentioned for the 
first time in a newspaper on the 29 of March – a Sunday. Since stock markets were closed on 
Sundays, we test the 30th of March as the first day after the notification when the stock market 
was open. The debates in the parliament before the law was signed were heated (Lässig, 1996, 
80). Thus the effect on stock returns might not be apparent since the market might have 
anticipated the event in advance.  
The second event is the first election with the restricted law. In the forefront of the election 
some Social democrats agitated at possible candidates for abstention in the election. 
Eventually the regional organization of the Social democrats left the decision to their 
members whether they wanted to run for the election or not. The election brought the 
expected effect. The Social democrats lost seats and influence (Lässig 1996, 87f). Frankfurter 
Zeitung wrote on the 28th of September: “indeed a splendid victory for the supporters of the 
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three-class franchise.”23 Furthermore, the low turnout within the third and the second class of 
voters was mentioned in the press.24 
The third event took place in November 1905. Here, Social democrats organized mass 
demonstration in cities all over the kingdom, claiming for a revision of the electoral law in 
Saxony. This was not the first time Social democrats organized political protests on the streets 
agitating for the revision of the electoral law, but this time Social democrats organized this 
event not only as a reaction to changes or possible changes but they also demonstrated their 
power. This was since 1896 the first kingdom wide mass demonstration, which was 
characterized by its very well organized, disciplined, calm and peaceful flow (Lässig, 1996, 
144f). However, in the forefront of the demonstrations, the fear that they would end up in 
violent riots was high and the military was put on alert on the 18th of November 1895.25  
The fourths and fifths event took place in 1909: We first study the effects of the day when the 
law that extended the suffrage again was passed and the day when the first election with the 
new law took place in which the Social democrats gained so many seats. The first event, the 
day when the law passed in the parliament, was not mentioned in the newspapers. As Lässig 
(1996, 233) points out, all parties, their members and supporters were equally insecure about 
the actual effects of the electoral law. The conservatives warned that the new elections would 
bring about a government of the mass, whereas Social democrats claimed that the effects of 
the law would probably be very limited. Unsurprisingly, first results quickly appeared in the 
Newspapers and were extensively debated. For instance, Frankfurter Zeitung published the 
first results on the same day of the election - the 22. of October -  and reported a ‘defeat of the 
                                                           
23
 ‘[..]Führwahr, ein stolzer Sieg der Anhänger des Dreiklassenwahlrechts‘ (Frankfurter Zeitung Nr. 269, 28th of 
September 1897. Evening edition)  
24
 ‘In den meisten Wahlkreisen, in denen gestern von der dritten und heute von der zweiten Klasse der Urwähler 
die Wahlmänner für den Landtag gewählt wurden, war die Beteiligung auffallend schlecht.[..]‘ (Frankfurter 
Zeitung Nr. 270, 29th of September 1897. Evening edition) 
25
 ‘Dresden, 18. November. Die hiesige Arbeiterzeitung erfährt: Wegen der Wahlrechtsprotestversammlungen, 
die heute Abend stattfinde, wurde Militär in den Kasernen konsigniert. Sämtliche Mannschaften des 
Garnisionsbezirks haben vierzig scharfe Patronen erhalten.’ (Frankfurter Zeitung Nr. 321, 19th November 1905. 
First morning edition)  
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Saxon conservatives’ as great success for the social democrats.26 Similarly, Berliner Börsen-
Zeitung noted a ‘remarkable swing to the left’.27 Table four summarizes the results and the 
expected effect of the stock market. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Data  
 
All data was hand collected from different historical sources: Information about which firms 
were listed on the stock market was taken from Salinger Börsenhandbuch 1896, 1897 and 
1909. Daily prices, Stückzinsen28 and dividends were taken from Berliner Börsenzeitung.  
We observe two mayor periods of changes. The first period was the period from December 
1895 to end 1896, in which the suffrage was restricted by the parliament against strong 
agitation of Social democrats. The second period was the change of this electoral law to a 
more open and modern suffrage against agitation of industrialist in 1909. Our analysis is 
based on all industrial firms headquartered in Saxony and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange, 
the major German stock market, in these periods. Thus we have two samples of industrial 
firms which mostly overlap (1895-1896 and 1909). Furthermore, we added a third sample to 
                                                           
26
 ‘Niederlage der sächsischen Konservativen. [..]Neben der Verluste der Konservativen bilden die Erfolge der 
Sozialdemokraten die hervorstechende Erscheinung des gestrigen Wahltages[..]‘ (Frankfurter Zeitung Nr.293, 
22nd of October 1909. Evening edition) 
27
 ‘[..]So viel geht jedoch aus dem bisherigen Wahlausgang schon hervor, daß sich im Sächsischen Landtag ein 
bemerkenswerter Ruck nach links vollzieht‘ ( Berliner Börsen-Zeitung Nr. 497, 23rd of October 1909) 
28
 Stückzinsen at the Berlin stock exchange were a fixed yearly dividend payment of 4 per cent of the face value 
in most cases, which was paid at the beginning of a trading year. When trading a share, the accumulated fraction 
of the Stückzinsen was added to the quoted share price (Saling 1897, 217ff.). The resulting drop in prices at the 
beginning of a trading year has to be recognized when performing the share price correction for dividend 
payments.  
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study the effects of the mass demonstrations in 1905, which mainly consist of the sample of 
1909, except for two firms who went public on the Berlin stock exchange in 1906.  
In 1896 the sample contains 24 industrial firms. Figure 3 shows the market capitalization of 
the sample for the period from November 1895 to November 1897 on a daily basis. One can 
already see the impact of the events. After the new law passed, the market experienced a 
period of relatively stable positive market returns up to the election. Shortly before the 
election the prices fall- which can be interpreted as a general insecurity of the electoral 
outcome. Afterwards the prices quickly recover. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
In 1909 the sample contains of 35 industrial firms. Figure 4 shows the market capitalization of 
the firms and the events in 1909. Some large banks which had a large amount of capital are 
excluded, thus the market capitalization of the sample is about ten percent of the GDP of the 
kingdom.29 
The capitalization of the portfolio reaches its peak on the 22 of September with a value of 
about 254 million Marks. It then falls until the 8. November to a level of about 248.5 million 
Marks and then steadily rises again. On a first view it looks as if indeed the election had a 
negative effect, starting shortly before the election. The stock market, however quickly 
recovered. The day when the law passes seems not to influence the stock market, possibly 
because in contrast to the election, the change in law was not discussed in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung. 
                                                           
29For the GDP of the kingdom see Fuhrmann (1914) and Hoffman (1959) 
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(Figure 4 about here) 
 
Results Event Study 
 
Table 5 provides the results for the five events applying market model and mean return 
model. At a first glance, the impact of the political changes had a strong impact, which alone 
is an interesting result, since event studies concerning regulatory changes perform often 
weakly as a result of information leakage and anticipation of the event long before (Binder, 
1998, 123).  
In March 1896 the new law that restricted the suffrage and introduced three class voting had- 
as expected- significant positive abnormal returns in the two week and in the four week 
window.  If we split the four week window, we can see that the positive effect happened after 
the introduction of the law. The extent of the restriction might not have been anticipated 
before but was clearly positively received among capitalists in the following period. 
So far the results perfectly fit Hypothesis 1. Capitalists and investors anticipated a reduction 
of democratization positively. This is the first quantitative evidence that capitalists and civil 
elites in the German Kaiserreich expected negative effect on the economy in case of more 
political participation of the working poor. 
The results of the first election after the introduction of the new law in 1896, however, do not 
perfectly fit the picture. Before and after the elections the situation on the market was 
pessimistic and the abnormal returns were negative. This might be driven by a general 
nervousness of how much the change in the law may influence the electoral results. However, 
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the significance diminishes in the two weeks after the event, indicating the relief of the 
investors after the publication of the election results.  
The mass demonstration again fits the picture: the market reacted negatively, although only 
significant in the four week window. Again it is interesting to note that the negative effect can 
mainly be observed in the two weeks before the demonstrations. Capitalist probably expected 
revolutionary and destructive protests and not the calm and well organized demonstrations 
that turned out. Thus after the event the market relaxed. This can also be interpreted as the 
beginning of acceptance of the Social democrats as a serious political power. 
The law passed in 1909 without echo in the press (We could not find a note in a newspaper). 
This might explain why this event had not much impact on the market. In the two weeks 
before the law passed the abnormal returns were significantly positive. However, after the law 
was passed this positive effect disappeared. This could indicate that investors reacted –
although only slightly- in a negative way. 
In order to understand more about investors and their behavior to the changes in the political 
system, we break our sample into two. The first sample contains the largest firms. In 1896 we 
consider five firms, which hold together 49 % of the total market capitalization in terms of 
capital stocks. In 1905 and 1909 we consider seven firms, who held 51 percent and 50 percent 
of the total capitalization, respectively. 
These results provide evidence for asymmetric information among investors. The prices of 
small firms reacted much heavier (more significantly) to the mass demonstration in 1905 and 
the passing of the law in 1909, the events that were not discussed in national wide 
newspapers. These firms were probably financed by regional investors, who recognized the 
atmosphere of change.  
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Large firms, on the other hand, who probably mainly attracted non regional investors, reacted 
far less to regional events such as the mass demonstrations, which could – apart from the 
information asymmetry - be explained by the fact that those investors did not fear higher 
income taxation and only a possible rise in taxation for the Saxon firms, in which they 
invested. 
Altogether the results support well hypothesis 1 that events associated with an extension of 
the suffrage such as the day when the electoral law passes or the first election with the new 
law lead to negative returns on the stock market and vice versa. Hypothesis 2 that the 
restriction of the suffrage had a lower effect than the extension of the suffrage on the stock 
market, since the latter might be associated with direct changes of the political and economic 
environment rather than just keeping the status quo, is only slightly supported. The effect of 
the restriction of the suffrage in 1896 was less significant if the event window was smaller. 
For larger event windows the effect was equally as strong. The election, however, after the 
extension of the suffrage had a much stronger effect than the election after the introduction of 
the three-class-voting.  
 
(Table 5 -7 about here) 
 
The results above are robust. Table 8 gives a comparison of the results from the standard 
event-study methodology and the generalised rank test.30 We compare for all event windows 
the sign of the abnormal return, i.e. whether it was positive or negative and whether the 
observed abnormal return was significant. Since the GRANK test standardises the data, a 
direct comparison of the average cumulated returns in the event window does not make sense. 
                                                           
30The exact results of the GRANK test are included in the Appendix. 
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We can use the average rank of all firms in the event-window: recalling that the GRANK test 
assigns ranks to the abnormal returns, a value below (above) the mean rank of 0.5 (i.e. the 
expected value of the abnormal return on the event day under the null-hypothesis) is 
equivalent to a negative (positive) ACAR. The table reads as follows: the columns marked 
“sign” show whether both the ACAR and the GRANK method produced the same result 
regarding the sign of the abnormal return. The corresponding entry for each event is “yes”, if 
both ACAR is below zero (above zero) and the corresponding average rank of the cumulated 
event-period from the GRANK test is below 60 (above 60). It is “no” if they do not coincide. 
The column “significance” compares the p-values of each test. The corresponding entry for 
each event is “yes”, if both are insignificant (at the 5 per cent level) or both are significant (at 
the 5 per cent level) and “no” otherwise.  
 
(Table 8 about here) 
 
In general, however, the results from both methods coincide for almost every event and event 
window. This suggests that non-normality of abnormal returns or cross-correlation between 
them does not seem to have been an issue in the original inference. Since possible cross-
correlation between abnormal returns might lead to an over-rejection of the null-hypothesis, 
we are particularly interested whether the highly significant results across all event-windows 
for the election of 1909 remain significant applying the generalised rank test. Table 8 shows 
that this is indeed the case. Two of the originally significant results for the publication of the 
new election law in 1909, however, are here insignificant.  
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Conclusion 
 
Saxony was one of the most industrialized regions at the time and also one of the strongholds 
of the Social democrats. It was further the only region in the Kaiserreich where the electoral 
law was changed twice. One change was introduced with the official aim to maintain the 
power of the powerful, which was for a long time a cartel of the National liberals and the 
Conservatives. In 1909, however, the suffrage was extended to the benefit of the working 
poor due to the pressure of the Social democrats and mass protests on the streets (Lässig 
1997).  
Theory suggests that an extension of the electoral law to the poor working class is followed 
by a rise in government spending and taxes (Husted and Kenny 1997, Lott and Kenny 1999) 
and an extension in the provision of public goods (Lizzeri and Persico 2004) in order to 
reallocate income from the rich to the poor and to achieve higher equality (Husted and Kenny 
1997, Justman and Gradstein 1999, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). This leads to more 
political freedom and subsequently to economic freedom which is needed for long run 
sustainable economic growth. However, the extension of democracy also leads to higher 
taxation and redistribution of income which reduced possible investment. This might have 
growth retarding features.  
In this context we tested two hypotheses how investors anticipated the changes. Hypothesis 1 
tested whether events associated with an extension of the suffrage lead to negative returns on 
the stock market and vice versa. The results clearly provided evidence for this hypothesis. 
However, the reactions were significant but only lasted for a short period. We often find 
dropping prices before events that were associated with an extended suffrage and a very quick 
recovering shortly after. Although Wehler (1994, 90) and others were right and capitalist 
clearly opposed the democratic development- they seemed to get used to it and the 
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revolutionary potential was obviously not too threatening. In fact we interpret our results as 
the beginning of the acceptance of Social Democracy and subsequently a larger participation 
of the working poor. 
Hypothesis 2 tested whether the restriction of the suffrage had a lower effect than the 
extension of the suffrage on the stock market, since the latter might be associated with direct 
changes of the political and economic environment rather than just keeping the status quo- 
This hypothesis was only slightly supported. The effect of the restriction of the suffrage in 
1896 was less significant if the event window was smaller. For larger event windows the 
effect was equally as strong.  Furthermore the election in 1909 had a very strong negative 
impact, which clearly supports this hypothesis. 
Furthermore the results provide evidence that the stock market was relatively efficient in the 
19th century since it reacted strongly, although not as quick as a modern market would do, i.e. 
we cannot observe effects in a one week event window.  
The paper also seems to provide some information about who actually invested. While large 
firms based in Saxony attracted investors from all over the country, who did not get every 
regional information, smaller firms possibly attracted rather regional investors. Prices of 
smaller regional firms reacted much stronger, indicating that their investors were more afraid 
of an extension of the power to the poor in the Kingdom than investors of larger firms.  The 
explanation might be that they could be affected twice: once by higher taxation of the firms 
and by higher taxation of their income. 
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TABLE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN SAXONY AND GERMANY IN 
PERCENT 
 1882 1895 1907 
Sector Saxony Germany Saxony Germany Saxony Germany 
Agriculture 20.0 42.5 15.1 35.8 10.7 28.6 
Industry 56.2 35.5 58.0 39.1 59.3 42.8 
Trade/Transport 12.0 10.0 14.0 11.5 15.2 13.4 
Servants 1.8 2.1 1.2 1.7 1,0 1.3 
Public Service 4.9 4.9 5.4 5.5 5,5 5,5 
Without 
occupation 
5.1 5.9 6.3 6.4 8,3 8,4 
Source: Lässig (1996, 34), data from the occupation census. 
 
 
TABLE 2: ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR DIFFERENT STATES 
  1900 1910  
State GDP p.c. in 
marks 
Pop. in 
1000 
interest 
payments 
on public 
debt in 
Billion 
marks 
GDP p.c. in 
marks 
Pop. in 
1000 
interest 
payments 
on public 
debt in 
Billion 
marks 
Baden 533 1856 12 669 2132 21 
Hesse 485 1113 9.8 596 1276 14.6 
Prussia 504 34267 231 651 39922 334 
Saxony 644 4163 27 799 4782 28 
Source: Hoffman (1959, 86) 
 
  
TABLE 3: RESULTS STATE ELECTIONS 1893-1909 (SEATS) 
Year Conservatives National 
liberals 
Party of 
Progress 
Germans German 
social 
Liberals Reformer Social 
democrats 
Total 
1893 43 14 8 1 1   1 14 82 
1895 44 16 6   1   1 14 82 
1897 50 21 3         8 82 
1899 52 22 3         4 81 
1901 58 21 2     1   0 82 
1903 57 22   1   1 1 0 82 
1905 54 23   2   1 1 1 82 
1907 46 31   3     1 1 82 
1909 24 28   8     6 25 91 
Source: Ritter (1990, 72) 
 
TABLE 4: OVERVIEW EVENTS 
Date 
(first appearance in 
newspaper) 
Event Participation of the 
working poor 
Effect on return 
according to 
H1                        H2 
30. März 1896  
 
New electoral law gets 
published 
Restricted Positive  lower 
28. September 1897   
 
Election Restricted Positive lower 
18/19. November 
1905 
 
Mass demonstration in 
Leipzig 
“Extended” negative higher 
5 May 1909(no 
newspaper notice) 
New electoral law gets 
published 
Extended negative higher  
22. October 1909 Election Extended negative higher 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: RESULTS EVENT STUDY 
      One week window  
(-3; +3) 
two week window  
(-7; +7) 
4 week window  
(-14; +14) 
two weeks before  
(-14; 0) 
two weeks after  
(0; 14) 
Date Event   ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
30. März 1896 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model 0.002 0.511 0.015 0.003 0.020 0.045 -0.004 0.218 0.026 0.002 
Mean Return 0.004 0.219 0.019 0.000 0.024 0.015 -0.003 0.372 0.027 0.001 
28. September 
1897   
Election Market Model 0.000 0.911 -0.002 0.497 -0.026 0.000 -0.015 0.004 -0.006 0.156 
Mean Return -0.001 0.739 -0.004 0.289 -0.030 0.000 -0.017 0.002 -0.009 0.051 
18. November 1905 Mass 
demonstrations 
Market Model 0.000 0.968 0.000 0.925 -0.013 0.167 -0.012 0.092 -0.001 0.913 
Mean Return 0.005 0.300 0.001 0.769 -0.039 0.000 -0.031 0.000 -0.006 0.269 
5 May 1909 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model -0.004 0.153 0.008 0.127 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.000 -0.008 0.121 
Mean Return -0.006 0.201 0.009 0.091 0.015 0.010 0.017 0.001 -0.009 0.098 
22. October 1909 Election Market Model -0.011 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.024 0.009 -0.014 0.002 -0.014 0.000 
Mean Return -0.013 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.018 0.020 -0.016 0.000 
 
 TABLE 6: RESULTS EVENT STUDY LARGEST FIRMS ONLY 
LARGEST FIRMS  
    One week window  
(-3; +3) 
two week window  
(-7; +7) 
4 week window  
(-14; +14) 
two weeks before  
(-14; 0) 
two weeks after 
 (0; 14) 
Date Event   ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
30. März 1896 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model -0.008 0.252 0.006 0.417 0.008 0.341 -0.006 0.334 0.011 0.093 
Mean Return -0.005 0.415 0.013 0.037 0.015 0.046 -0.004 0.532 0.015 0.013 
28. September 1897  Election Market Model -0.008 0.113 -0.020 0.000 -0.047 0.000 -0.015 0.004 -0.030 0.000 
Mean Return -0.011 0.032 -0.026 0.000 -0.050 0.000 -0.023 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
18. November 1905 Mass 
demonstrations 
Market Model 0.014 0.435 -0.012 0.368 -0.040 0.138 -0.038 0.195 0.009 0.525 
Mean Return 0.019 0.285 -0.011 0.418 -0.064 0.033 -0.055 0.075 0.004 0.781 
5 May 1909 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model -0.001 0.758 0.006 0.445 0.000 0.961 0.005 0.425 -0.007 0.587 
Mean Return -0.002 0.519 0.007 0.394 0.001 0.914 0.007 0.219 -0.008 0.503 
22. October 1909 Election Market Model -0.008 0.004 -0.006 0.035 -0.027 0.000 -0.014 0.002 -0.016 0.002 
Mean Return -0.011 0.002 -0.009 0.003 -0.038 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.021 0.001 
Note: sample reduced to 1896: 5 firms, 49% of total market capitalisation; 1905: 7 firms 51% of total market capitalisation, 1909: 7 firms, 50 % of total market capitalization 
 
 
 
 TABLE 7: RESULTS EVENT STUDY, SMALLER FIRMS 
      One week window  
(-3; +3) 
two week window  
(-7; +7) 
4 week window  
(-14; +14) 
two weeks before  
(-14; 0) 
two weeks after  
(0; 14) 
Date Event 
  ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
30. März 1896 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model 0.005 0.177 0.017 0.004 0.023 0.059 -0.004 0.343 0.029 0.003 
Mean Return 0.006 0.095 0.020 0.001 0.026 0.031 -0.003 0.471 0.031 0.002 
28. September 1897   Election Market Model 0.002 0.349 0.002 0.490 -0.021 0.004 -0.015 0.018 0.000 0.971 
Mean Return 0.002 0.499 0.002 0.634 -0.015 0.021 -0.015 0.023 -0.002 0.694 
18. November 1905 Mass 
demonstrations 
Market Model -0.004 0.049 0.003 0.376 -0.005 0.566 -0.005 0.295 -0.003 0.561 
Mean Return 0.001 0.652 0.004 0.189 -0.030 0.000 -0.023 0.000 -0.008 0.129 
5 May 1909 New electoral law 
gets published 
Market Model -0.003 0.263 0.010 0.094 0.020 0.005 0.021 0.000 -0.007 0.177 
Mean Return -0.006 0.087 0.010 0.132 0.019 0.007 0.020 0.000 -0.009 0.129 
22. October 1909 Election Market Model -0.012 0.000 -0.011 0.001 -0.023 0.039 -0.014 0.010 -0.014 0.000 
Mean Return -0.013 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.030 0.005 -0.017 0.000 -0.015 0.000 
Note: Sample without largest firms (see table 6) 
 
 
  
TABLE 8: RESULTS ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
 
      One week window  
(-3; +3) 
two week window  
(-7; +7) 
4 week window  
(-14; +14) 
two weeks before  
(-14; 0) 
two weeks after  
(0; 14) 
Date Event 
  sign significance sign significance sign significance sign significance sign significance 
30. März 1896 New electoral law gets 
published 
Market Model yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
28. September 1897   Election Market Model no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
18. November 1905 Mass demonstrations Market Model yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
5 May 1909 New electoral law gets 
published 
Market Model yes yes yes yes yes no yes no yes yes 
22. October 1909 Election Market Model yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
 
FIGURE 1: THE BIAS OF THE WEIGHTED VOTES 
 
Note: the law before 1896 had an equal weighting of votes, thus if we would draw a line it would be the 
45degree line. This would be misleading, since the overall number of eligible voters was far below the laws in 
later years. 
Source: own calculations, data from Ritter (1980, 172). 
 
FIGURE 2: ESTIMATION AND EVENT WINDOW 
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FIGURE 3: MARKET CAPITALISATION OF SAXON INDUSTRIAL FIRM ON THE BERLIN STOCK 
EXCHANGE 1895 1897 
Law 1896 First election
Three class
voting
 
Source: Salinger Börsenpapiere 1895/1896/1897, Berliner Börsenzeitung 
 
FIGURE 4: MARKET CAPITALISATION OF SAXON INDUSTRIAL FIRM ON THE BERLIN STOCK 
EXCHANGE 1909 
Publication
of the first
election
resultsNew electorallaw passed
End of 
second 
ballot
Mill
Marks
 
 Source: Salinger Börsenpapiere 1909, Berliner Börsenzeitung 
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APPENDIX 
 
Formal presentation of the generalised rank (GRANK) test 
 
Following Kothari and Pythonnen (2011) , let  t=0 denote the event-day, t=T0+1,...,T1 is the 
estimation period. T1+1,...,T2 are the days in the event window. Additionally, let L1= T1 - T0 
be the length of the estimation period and T2 - T1 the length of the event period.  
Abnormal returns are calculated as above using the market model. Standardised abnormal 
returns for the estimation period are then given by 
it
it
it S
ARSAR =
 for t=T0+1,...,T1 .,  
 
where S i ,t= Σ1
T1( ARi , t− ̄(ARi))2
 is the standard deviation of abnormal return in the estimation 
period. The cumulated abnormal return of firm i in the event period is defined as 
∑
−
+=
−
=
12
1
12
1
,
TT
Tt
itTTi ARCAR . 
Divided by the standard deviation of the abnormal returns of firm i SCARi ,τ  (which is given by 
γ ' V γ
, where γ is a vector of ones with the length of the event-window and V is the 
conditional covariance matrix of the event-window returns.1), yields the standardised 
cumulated abnormal return SCARi,τ for firm i. 
12,
12
12
,
,
TTCAR
TTi
TTi
i
S
CAR
SCAR
−
−
−
= ,  
                                                           
1
For details, see  Campbell et al (1997, 159-160) 
2 
 
Then the standardised CAR's are re-standardised with the cross-sectional standard deviation 
corrected for cross-sectional correlation 
 
12,
12,*
,
TTSCAR
TTi
i
i
S
SCAR
SCAR
−
−
=  
 
where SSCART 2− T 1=
1
n− 1∑i= 1
n
(SCARi ,T 2− T 1− SCART 2− T 1)2
1− r
 and r is the average correlation in the 
sample. 
Generalised standardized abnormal returns, GSAR, are then defined as follows 
GSARi ,t=(SCARi* for T 1+ 1≤ t≤ T 2SARi ,t for t= T 0+ 1,... , T 1).  
In brief, the event period is considered as one point in time with the value SCARi* for firm i, 
while the estimation period GSAR's are the normal standardised values for each day. Treating 
the event period returns as one single observation leads to a new number of total observations, 
i.e.  the number of observations in the estimation period plus 1. 
For each firm, ranks ( K 1, K2 ,... , KT ) are assigned to the GSAR's, so that GSARt≥ GSARs  
implying K t≥ K s , i.e. the lowest rank 1 is assigned to the lowest return of firm i and the 
highest rank T is assigned to the highest return. Divided by T+1 and minus 0,5 - the mean 
rank2, yields Ui,t. 
                                                           
2
Using the Gaussian sum formula, one can easily verify that the mean rank for any series of ranks from 1 to T is 
given by 
(T + 1)
2 . If one first divides each rank by T+1, the mean rank is then given by 0,5. 
3 
 
1
)(
,
, +
=
T
GSARrank
U titi -0,5 
3
 
These can be used to formulate the test statistic, tgrank, : 
t grank= Z ( T− 2T − 1− Z 2 )
0.5
, where Z =
U 0
S U and 
SU = ( 1T ∑t= 1
T
U t
2)
0.5
. 
 
U 0
 and U t are the averaged ranks over firms on the event day and point in time t, 
respectively. SU  is the standard deviation of the average rank over time. 
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns on the event day, the distribution of the test 
statistic is asymptotically normal. 
                                                           
3
 See Corrado and Zivney (1992). 
4 
 
 
Results of the GRANK test 
The following table reproduces the results of the GRANK test for the different events and event-windows.  
 
 
      
One week window  
(-3,+3) 
Two week window  
(-7;+7) 
4 week window  
(-14;+14) 
Two weeks before  
(-14;0) 
Two weeks after  
(0;+14) 
Date Event  Model average 
rank 
p-value average 
rank 
p-value average 
rank 
p-value average 
rank 
p-value average 
rank 
p-value 
12. December  
1895 
 
Social Democrats claim 
new electoral law 
Market 
Model 
50,000 0,377 38,909 0,079 34,455 0,033 48,909 0,333 31,500 0,018 
30. March 1896 
 
 
New electoral law gets 
published 
Market 
Model 
71,818 0,395 92,318 0,017 81,318 0,122 57,955 0,817 91,000 0,023 
28. September 
1897 
 
Election Market 
Model 
58,909 0,827 57,364 0,706 32,909 0,004 34,091 0,006 45,273 0,105 
18. November 
1905 
 
Mass demonstrations Market 
Model 
61,467 0,958 61,500 0,956 31,800 0,000 27,267 0,000 51,233 0,227 
5 May 1909 New electoral law passed Market 
Model 
45,938 0,094 74,531 0,145 71,875 0,250 75,844 0,117 56,594 0,641 
23. October 1909 Election Market 
Model 
25,688 0,000 33,250 0,001 30,813 0,000 36,750 0,002 24,094 0,000 
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